

Review Article

Open Access

How to Use AI in Philosophy and Theology: Description of the Experience of Certain Possibilities

Jakub Z Lichański

Full Professor, Humanities in the Discipline of Literary Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland

ABSTRACT

Today, we need to ask not about the possibilities that AI creates for philosophy and theology, but how to use these possibilities. Hence, a review of the state of research will be necessary, but at the same time it will be selective. Also, the description of my experience with AI tools and tools such as rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*), hypertexts or mind mapping provide some insight into the title issue. The description and analysis of both the three title concepts, as well as their meaning ranges, will allow for the acceptance of preliminary definitions and meaning ranges of the concepts, as well as what can be achieved in cooperation with AI tools for, for example, posing research problems in these fields.

The conclusion of the considerations is positive. AI tools in such research are simply necessary to use. However, we must prepare such research programs, or clearly formulated questions that we will ask Chat GPT. Therefore, we can safely say that AI tools (here reading Annex 1 is instructive), or computer programs are simply indispensable tools in research in the field of philosophy or theology. Annexes 2 and 3 show what the results of cooperation with, for example, Chat GPT are. This is the title of the report from the "Smithsonian Magazine" How *AI Is Helping Scholars* Unlock the Secrets of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

*Corresponding author

Jakub Z Lichański, Full Professor, Humanities in the Discipline of Literary Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland.

Received: January 22, 2026; **Accepted:** January 27, 2026; **Published:** February 04, 2026

Keywords: Hypertext, Mind mapping, *Téchne rhetoriké*, PhilPapers, Documenta Catholica Omnia, Eric Dietrich, Michelle Thomas, Vincent C Müller, Aidan Isaacs (AI), Nupoor Ranade, Marly Saravia, Aditya Johri

Introduction with Elements of Description of the State of Research

Today, we need to ask not about the possibilities that AI creates for philosophy and theology, but how to use these possibilities. Hence, a review of the state of research will be necessary, but at the same time it will be selective; great help in this is provided by, among others, the works of Eric Dietrich and Michelle Thomas, as well as the study by Vincent C. Müller. Also, the description of my experiences from working with AI tools and such tools as rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*), hypertexts or mind mapping (which I treat as knowledge of four mathematical operations) provide some insight into the title issue. The description and analysis of both the three title concepts will allow for the acceptance of preliminary definitions and semantic ranges of the concepts, as well as what can be achieved in cooperation with AI tools for, for example, posing research problems in these fields [1-11]. Once we define this, we can answer the title question. It is worth noting here the wealth of bibliographic materials on AI tools, even if only taken from the bibliography provided in the *PhilPapers* database. It currently amounts to 11,789 items, see Annex 1. The comments of Eric Dietrich and Michelle Thomas in the abstract preceding the bibliography are of significant importance [10].

The philosophy of artificial intelligence is a collection of issues primarily concerned with whether or not AI is possible -- with whether or not it is possible to build an intelligent thinking machine. Also, of concern is whether humans and other animals are best thought of as machines (computational robots, say) themselves. The most important of the "whether-possible" problems lie at the intersection of theories of the semantic contents of thought and the nature of computation. A second suite of problems surrounds the nature of rationality. A third suite revolves around the seeming "transcendent" reasoning powers of the human mind. These problems derive from Kurt Gödel's famous Incompleteness Theorem. A fourth collection of problems concerns the architecture of an intelligent machine. Should a thinking computer use discrete or continuous modes of computing and representing, is having a body necessary, and is being conscious necessary. This takes us to the final set of questions. Can a computer be conscious? Can a computer have a moral sense? Would we have duties to think computers, to robots? For example, is it moral for humans to even attempt to build an intelligent machine? If we did build such a machine, would turning it off be the equivalent of murder? If we had a race of such machines, would it be immoral to force them to work for us?

A probably unintentional comment on these remarks are the words of Vincent V. Müller, who in his study included in the *Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence* noted that [11].

This paper presents the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of artificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understanding of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so, we suggest that "AI Philosophy" provides a new method for philosophy.

Description and analysis of the indicated items - although this is only a selection based on the *pars pro toto* principle - allows us to provide preliminary definitions and scopes of meaning of the concepts we will use. Once we define this, we can answer the title question. Especially since the experiences, quite modest, let's add, of my own works point to another source that, it seems, has been omitted. It is rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*), which provided and provides tools for defining the research problem and the organization of the text itself.

Concepts

It is relatively easiest to provide a definition of philosophy. Following Lalande, we can assume that philosophy is *Savoir rationnel, science, au sens le plus général du mot* [ibidem, 774]; however, Lalande further indicates that such a general definition had to be specified and discusses several extensions of this concept [2]. The purpose of philosophizing is: *Finis philosophandi est veritas acquirenda propter seipsam / The purpose of philosophizing is to obtain truth for its own sake* [12].

I think that when it comes to philosophy as a method, the most useful will be critical philosophy in the sense of Kant, but also with the expansion proposed by Edith Stein [13-15]. As for Edith Stein's views, she says in *Einführung in die Philosophie* that *phenomenology aims only at understanding the world* [14].

However, it is worth pointing to the study Kant und Artificial Intelligence, which is, as the editors of this volume Hyeongjoo Kim and Dieter Schönecker write: [...] *how one can judge the claims and limits of Artificial Intelligence on the basis of Kantian philosophy* [16]. *And it certainly does not preclude pursuing the question, conversely, of how one can evaluate the claims of Kant and Kantian philosophy from the perspective of Artificial Intelligence. The contributions in this volume deal with both questions.*

A similar position is also taken by Steven S. Gouveia and Carlos Moruájo in the article *Phenomenology and artificial intelligence: introductory notes* and the entire issue of the journal "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science: Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence: Bridges and New Paths" is worthy of attention [17].

So, we have confirmation that such research is worth conducting and that it yields interesting results. Theology, but which one, or rather which one According to the indicated authors, theology is [...] *a conscious effort made by a believer to listen to the authentic, historically announced word of God's revelation, an effort to get to know this word by means of scientific methods and to reflectively develop the results achieved in this way* [3].

However, the authors further indicate several extensions of this term. Aidan Isaacs (AI) put these issues in a slightly simpler way

in his article *The Dangers of Artificial Intelligence to Theology: A Comprehensive Analysis*, who points out that [theology is an understanding of] *the unique status of humanity as [creatures] created in the image of God* [9]. Since the text was written by Chat GPT (as reported by the editors of the website!) we should take this suggestion into account. However, we can note research on the connections between theology and AI tools, including the articles by Wojciech P. Grygiel *Artificial intelligence and scholastic epistemology* or Lluís Oviedo *Artificial Intelligence and Theology: Looking for a positive – but not critical – reception* [18-19]. The conclusion of Wojciech Grygiel's article points to a rather important question: are there non-algorithmizable aspects of human thinking? If so - Searl's argument about the Chinese Room returns - then we have quite a serious limitation in the use of experimental methods in the study of human thinking [18]. However, Lluís Oviedo's attitude is more positive, as he concludes quite clearly [19].

What is interesting is how the disruption of these new technologies can open new horizons for an engaged theology aimed at designing better conditions for personal and collective living. Theology perceives itself in all this process as a discerning instance that assists in several areas to make sense of new and promising developments. From this perspective, the relationship between theological studies and AI offers clear advances: the mutual interaction between the two research areas would provide theology with a confirmation of its relevance (especially in issues spanning from ethics to the relationship between humanity with transcendence), and with a new task: contributing to addressing and discovering issues related to the development of AI systems. This goal can be achieved only through a greater theological engagement with the recent developments of AI and their practical relevance. The anthropological issues appear pressing and they need to be addressed as a previous condition for any ethical analysis. This is an open field after the current developments can take different directions and require steady engagement from a theological side.

So also, in the field of theology, although with some questions and doubts, the answer to the question posed in the title is positive.

Finally, AI - and again how it is understood [14,4]. Earl B. Hunt defined the tasks of AI already in 1975 and later they were only specified according to him - I use the Russian translation [1,4].

AI is to perform, among others, proving theorems, games [this concept should be expanded and also include, for example, teaching and learning, etc.], image recognition, solving tasks, programming, processing data, especially in large sets of them, etc.

Its tasks are defined similarly today [7]. The authors indicate that AI is to perform (ibidem, 222-223):

(1) *machine learning mechanisms, including supervised learning, unsupervised machine learning, and reinforcement learning, with the use of a wide range of methods including deep learning;*
(2) *logic and knowledge-based methods, including knowledge representation, inductive (logic) programming, knowledge bases, inference and deduction engines, (symbolic) reasoning;*
(3) *statistical approaches, Bayesian estimation, and search and optimisation methods.*

Matthew J. Gaudet, in his introduction to the special issue of the "Journal of Moral Theology" additionally draws attention to the

importance of the question of a specific “ethics of AI technology”. He emphasizes that [6].

The possibility of developing a general AI or superintelligence will raise profound theological and philosophical questions about the nature of creation and the place of humans, AI and God in this creation. Will AI be worthy of some or all of the rights and protections that we attribute to humans? Will it require us to develop new and different moral laws or principles? Will AI creators be like gods to their intelligent computers, or, if we achieve superintelligence, will AI become a god to us? Advances in technology throughout history have challenged our understanding of divinity; these advances may destroy our current understanding of the relationship between the Divine God-Creator and creation itself and strain our theology in new ways.

If we accept the above descriptions of not only the definitions of concepts but also their ranges of meaning as *status quaestionis* for further considerations, we can assume that we have a fairly clearly defined starting point for an attempt to answer the hypothesis formulated in the title [23,24].

And one more introductory remark: the tools that will be used in these considerations are taken from the theory of rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*) as the most useful. Aristotle already pointed this out in *Metaphysics*, when he wrote (ARIST., metaph., 995a17-21).

Therefore, one must learn how to use every type of argument, because it is absurd to seek knowledge and the method of knowledge at the same time; it is not easy even to master one of them.

I would also like to remind you that, according to Wilhelm Windelband and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Rhetoric* belongs to the *Organon*, that is, to Aristotle’s logical writings Windelband 1905, 387 sqq; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1905, 100-101sqg [20,21]. This, by the way, will be confirmed in the manifesto of the Vienna Circle (*Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung* 1929, 299-338). Some of the indicated problems (philosophy, religion) were also presented in the study *Contemporary Humanities* (*Contemporary Humanities* 2023), which is presented as part of the series Social Dictionaries published by the Ignatianum University in Krakow, as the editors of the series write (ibidem, 7): [...] *the publication, which has over twenty volumes, will present the state of humanistic and social knowledge in the third decade of the 21st century; knowledge about humans developing in diverse civilizations, cultures and societies, professing various religions and honoring different patterns of conduct.*

The authors of the individual entries included in the cited study indicate possible connections between contemporary studies on, among others, philosophy and religion and AI tools. However, the issues are only highlighted without a broader explanation of these connections, which seems somewhat surprising to me.

Description of own Works and Experiences

The theory of rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*) provides, as Karl-Heinz Göttert has clearly shown, a very good tool for preparing any text the issue of clearly defining the research problem - this is about the science of status - was discussed quite a long time ago by Hermogenes, and described by, among others, Richard E. Volkmann and Michael Hoppmann [23] Hoppmann [22,23].

This is Connected with Correctly asking the Question about what we want to Investigate. This is Based on the Following Steps

1. Clear formulation of the research problem in the form of a question or series of questions, using the science of status, and topics,
2. Clear definition of the purpose of the text, as well as to whom it is addressed and where it is to be presented; we must also know the audience and their level of competence,
3. Selection of a specific composition of the text taking into account the results of points 1 and 2, i.e. what is the problem, what is the meaning of the concepts used, are they fully adequate, do they not raise doubts, when, for example, we are dealing with tropes or figures of words and thoughts, and on what to poses (in scientific texts they can be axioms or generally accepted opinions and judgments) will I base my text?

Does the Conclusion Follow from the Presented Inferences?

I presented this issue most fully in the article *Rhetoric, Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof, theology. A Few Remarks* where, using mainly the principles of status science, I demonstrated the correctness of the rhetorical construction of the proof, which is confirmed by the study of Christoph Benzmüller and Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo, who used AI tools [11,25]. This result is, in my opinion, significant because it demonstrated not only the usefulness of AI tools in confirming the correctness of Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof, but also the usefulness of rhetoric theory tools in analyzing this proof.

Let’s be emphatic: when preparing exercises, e-learning is of course a huge help, as indicated by, for example, the authors of the *Reference Guide to Writing Across the Curriculum* [Bazerman, Little, Bethel, Chavkin, Fouquette, Garufis 2005 or the *Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing* (2017), and, more importantly, such authors as Nupoor Ranade, Marly Saravia, Aditya Johri [26,27], whose study I mention later.

In conclusion, I will point to two texts. The author of the first of them is Atila Hallsby [28], who at the end of his text, he points to a significant problem.

By embracing rhetoric’s capaciousness and its own copious, void-like qualities, we may find familiar lessons from its history, theory, and practice, helping us to respond in real time to AI’s evolving shapes. Ultimately, tracking rhetoric’s trace-like structure must account for AI’s carceral and emancipatory potentials, its bivalent capacity for dystopia and being-in-common. To do otherwise would risk leaving our future interconnections undertheorized and unrealized.

The second text by Nupoor Ranade, Marly Saravia, Aditya Johri [Ranade, Saravia, Johri, 2024, 1-22] shows how what Atila Hallsby considered an obstacle to the direct application of the tools of rhetorical theory can be “bypassed” to obtain a convenient tool for creating, using AI tools, including Chat GPT, texts on specific problems tailored to the recipient and their requirements. The authors point out that.

In this paper, we look to the technical communication field and its methods of text generation-the rhetorical situation-to conceptualize prompt engineering in a more comprehensible way for its users by considering the context and rhetoric. We introduce a framework, consisting of a formula, to prompt engineering, which demands all components of the rhetorical situation be present in the inputted prompt. We present discussions on the

future of AI writing models and their use in both professional and educational settings. Ultimately, this discussion and its findings aim to provide a means of integrating agency and writer-centric methods to AI writing tools to advance a more human-in-the-loop approach. As the use of generative AI and especially NLP-based technologies become common across societal functions, the use of prompt engineering will play a crucial role not just in adoption of the technology, but also its productive and responsible use.

In my works, using the indications of, among others, WAC, I have used these possibilities, even though the considerations of the authors and their practical remarks contained in the Annex attached to their text, for obvious reasons, were not known to me. I believe that Atilla Hallsby did not notice the issue that what was considered parts of rhetoric was an instruction of the principles of text construction, as Quintus Cornificius and Marcus Fabius Quintilianus had already pointed out. And for the development of such instructions, the tools provided by AI, as well as GPT, are fully useful.

Attempt to Prove the Hypothesis

So, the correctly formulated hypothesis is: how can AI be used in philosophy and theology? The answer to this question will concern searching large data sets; searching not for answers, but for possible answers to specific questions from the scope of both philosophy and theology. As for philosophy, if we take into account Edith Stein's remark that the main task of philosophy - not only phenomenology - is to understand the world, then the tools offered by AI can be extremely useful. The previously indicated works Gouveia, Moruájo 2024, *Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence* 2024] are examples that this is indeed the case [16,17]. However, I think it would be of great help to use AI tools to compile a dictionary of concepts that philosophies, or rather individual philosophers, use to accomplish the task of understanding the world. These can be knowledge bases, as well as what we define as methods / apparatus / engines of inference and deduction, (symbolic) inference. The latter may be the most complicated, because inference based on symbols would require, for example, "writing out" Pseudo-Hraban's work (Pseudo-Garnier of Langres is now considered the author) *Philosophers ought to develop, theorize about*. In Annex 2, I provide information obtained from Chat GPT about this work. Thanks to this tool, we avoid the problem in the field of linguistics, because although the work of Ps-Garnier of Langres refers to the Bible in the Vulgate version, a separate dictionary in modern languages becomes unnecessary, because Chat CPT gives answers in the language it is "asked" for, cf. Annex 2, in which I deliberately leave the examples of answers in Polish cited by GPT. And by the way, the problem raised by Piotr Abelard in the treatise *Sic et Non* is again solved with the help of the AI tool [29]. Probably also the proposal presented by Graham Clay, Caleb Ontiveros in the article *Philosophers ought to develop, theorize about, and use philosophically relevant AI* resolves the doubt about the usefulness of using AI tools in philosophy. They conclude [30].

We have here that philosophers have an obligation to spend significant effort developing, theorizing about, and using AI to do philosophy, at least insofar as they should spend effort philosophizing. To arrive at this conclusion, we have argued that philosophers have an obligation to increase epistemic philosophical progress via a given method corresponding to the degree that they can increase it via that method, and that the integration of AI tools with philosophical practice would transform the field and lead to significant progress of this sort. The path we have taken in this paper has involved discussion of specific AI tools that we think would be especially helpful

to philosophers, both in general and relative to our epistemic definition of philosophical progress. We maintain, however, that there are many alternative paths to the same conclusion that depend on premises concerning different sorts of tools, different definitions of philosophical progress, and, indeed, different goods beyond philosophical progress entirely. These alternative paths to the same conclusion are a function of the great and multifaceted promise of AI. It should not be underestimated.

In relation to theology, these issues, as indicated by the previously cited works *The Cambridge Companion to Religion* 2024], that such possibilities exist, although we will probably encounter here the problem of the existence of non-algorithmic aspects of human thinking. However, nothing stands in the way of undertaking work that would be very troublesome without AI tools, such as the problems of, for example, translating patristic texts, including the compilation of a multilingual dictionary for research on the Bible or other sacred texts [18,19]. And again, thanks to AI tools, and mainly with the help of Chat GPT, I can receive, in any language, information about how a specific fragment of the Bible sounds in a given language, cf. Annex 3. Which can solve the problem of access to the previously indicated editions of the Bible, as well as patristic treatises. Also - thanks to this, it will be possible to "bypass" the problem of compiling multilingual dictionaries. The problem of examining whether the translations will be faithful *salva veritate* and *salva significate* becomes quite simple to resolve.

However, Aidan Isaacs's article *The Dangers of Artificial Intelligence to Theology: A Comprehensive Analysis* [9] dampens our hopes somewhat. In conclusion, the author says.

The advent of artificial intelligence presents profound challenges to theological discourse, particularly concerning epistemology and the image of God. Epistemologically, the opacity, bias, and lack of accountability inherent in AI-generated knowledge raise significant concerns about discerning truth in the age of AI. The integrity of theological inquiry depends on the ability to navigate these challenges and distinguish genuine insights from distortions perpetuated by AI systems. Moreover, the widespread integration of AI threatens to undermine the theological understanding of humanity's unique status as creatures made in the image of God. By eroding human agency, moral autonomy, and relationality, AI fosters dependence on non-human entities and diminishes the significance of human creativity, ethical reflection, and communal solidarity. To preserve the theological integrity of human existence, theologians must engage critically with the implications of AI and advocate for ethical frameworks that uphold the dignity and worth of every human being as reflections of the divine image.

It may be worth adding that the author is, as the website editors inform: not a real person. His profile photo was generated using an artificial intelligence image generator, and this article was written using ChatGPT.

However, despite this reservation, AI tools will be extremely useful in works on theology as well. But the programs, or rather the questions we will ask GPT - we must prepare, which results from Larson's comments [5]. Besides, before I got to know Larson's study, I had to, also using the experience of, among others, WAC, prepare similar solutions for students myself, including exercises. Not to mention my own studies.

Discussion

However, the presented proposal raises several doubts. The first is related to the issues of philology, as well as rhetoric and

hermeneutics as research tools of philology [31,32]. The first position in particular raises important issues, because when we describe and analyze both biblical and patristic texts, as well as prepare appropriate AI tools, including using the possibilities offered by GPT, for their research.

Also of importance are the studies discussed, for example, by Klaus Berger in the study *Einführung in die Formgeschichte* [33]. The researcher describes literary forms that appear in both biblical and patristic texts and their variability.

Finally, we should not forget about the document prepared by the Pontifical Biblical Commission concerning the interpretation of the Holy Scripture [*Interpretation of the Holy Scripture* 1994]. Together with the aforementioned study by Berger, both publications show the difficulties we encounter when describing and analyzing biblical texts.

Some of these issues have been discussed in the studies already cited, such as the special issue of the *Journal of Moral Theology*, or *The Cambridge Companion to Religion and Artificial Intelligence* [34]. I will not even consider the need to analyze such Internet sources as the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* or *PhilPapers*, as well as encyclopedias such as Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher's *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, which also provides information, especially linguistic information, on the interpenetration of concepts – let's be cautious – related not only to mythology, but also to religion in Indo-European languages. Which may be of paramount importance when creating dictionaries of such concepts. Moreover, the preparation of such tools was defined quite a long time ago by Jan Kazimierzczak, who pointed out that we will be dealing with a cybernetic system with purposeful behavior [35]. However, we, as its creators, must define the goal. We will ask the question posed in Marius Dorobantu's study *Artificial Intelligence and Christianity: Friends or Foes?* [36] differently. The issues discussed should be expanded to include comments resulting from two events, which, although they do not directly concern the issues discussed, indicate directions for further research on AI. I am referring to the meeting in Paris on February 10-11, 2025, cf. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/12/paris-ai-summit-why-wont-us-uk-sign-global-artificial-intelligence-pact>, (2025-02-13), as well as materials related to the IASEAI'25 conference in Paris, cf. <https://www.iaseai.org/conference/program>, (2025-02-12).

Conclusion

Contrary to appearances, the conclusion of these considerations is positive. AI tools are absolutely necessary for use in such research. Let's say it clearly - without AI tools, such work as I mentioned is impossible to do.

However, we must prepare such research programs; just as we must ask Chat GPT specific questions. Because - let me remind you - it "works" on text models based on large collections of texts. The examples given in Annexes 2 and 3 show what such cooperation between a researcher and Chat GPT looks like.

At the same time, we already have achievements, and significant ones at that in such research *The Cambridge Companion to Religion* 2024; JMT 2022, vol. 11, Issue 1; Dietrich, Thomas 2025] [10,16,18,19]. One can point out the results that AI tools have given us when reading, for example, the manuscripts from Herculaneum and the scrolls from Qumran. It is true that it is

not strictly about AI, but rather about a computer algorithm [37-39]. I am pointing here to information from the Internet, not just scientific studies, because I rather want to indicate that such work is already being done and is bringing results. However, as emphasized in these reports, the results were achieved thanks to programs developed by specific researchers [40-41]. As in the work of Christoph Benz Müller and Bruno Woltzenlogel-Paleo.

I think the aforementioned remark that the tools of rhetorical theory (*téchne rhetoriké*), together with AI tools, are useful in such works suggests that it is worth considering the application of AI tools to the tools of rhetorical theory (*téchne rhetoriké*). Especially since existing works indicate such a possibility [27].

Therefore, we can safely say that AI tools or computer programs are an indispensable tool in research in the field of philosophy or theology. Let us not forget, however, that they are of an auxiliary nature and an old definition of the tasks that face both philosophies, i.e. understanding the world and, let us add, our efforts in this area, and theology, i.e. understanding the unique status of humanity as [creatures] created in the image of God, this is our task. As God defined it when he said to Mr. Adam and Mrs. Eve, subdue the Earth. AI will not perform this task for us. This is the title of the report from "Smithsonian Magazine" - which should be emphasized - *How A.I. Is Helping Scholars Unlock the Secrets of the Dead Sea Scrolls* [42-55].

Websites

Dietrich, Thomas 2025, <https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-artificial-intelligence>, 2025-01-17
Documenta Catholica Omnia, <http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu>, 2019-01-16
Herculaneum papyri : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herculaneum_papyri, 2025-02-06 [tu: bogata literatura przedmiotu]
How A.I. Is Helping Scholars, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/ai-finds-new-clues-dead-sea-scrolls-origins-180977571/>, (2025-01-13)
Inside the AI competition, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/inside-the-ai-competition-that-decoded-an-ancient-scroll-and-changed/>, (2025-01-13)
International Rhetoric Culture Project, <https://www.soziologie.uni-konstanz.de/meyer/forschung/forschungsprojekte/international-rhetoric-culture-project/>, [2024-04-23]
Migne, https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/25_Migne.html, (2025-01-11)
Papirus z Herkulanum, <https://aioai.pl/papirus-z-herkulanum-odczytany-przy-uzyciu-sztucznej-inteligencji/>, (2025-01-13)
Paris AI summit, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/12/paris-ai-summit-why-wont-us-uk-sign-global-artificial-intelligence-pact>, (2025-02-13)
PhilPapers, <https://philpapers.org/>, (2025-02-10)
Rhetoric Culture Theory, <https://oxfordre.com/anthropology/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190854584.001.0001/acrefore-9780190854584-e-588>, [2024-04-23]
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/>, 2019-01-16

Vesuvius Challenge, <https://scrollprize.org/>, (2025-02-06)

Zagadka Wielkiego Zwoju Izajasza, <https://kopalniawiedzy.pl/zwoje-znad-Morza-Martwego-zwoje-z-Qumran-Wielki-Zwoj-Izajasza-sztuczna-inteligencja,33640>, (2025-01-13)

Appendix 1: Substantive Scope of the Bibliography in the Publication Dietrich, Thomas 2025.

Artificial Minds (2,139 | 396), The Turing Test (482), Godelian Arguments Against AI (269), The Chinese Room (277), Machine Consciousness (382), The Singularity* (112), Mind Uploading* (54), Artificial Minds, Misc (333), **Representation in Artificial Intelligence** (876 | 191), Symbols and Symbol Systems (297), Computational Semantics (107), Implicit/Explicit Rules and Representations (84), AI without Representation? (46), Representation in Connectionism* (123), Subsymbolic Computation* (46), Computation and Representation, Misc (151), **Neural Networks and Connectionism** (1,015 | 523), Connectionism and Compositionality (73), Representation in Connectionism (123), Connectionism and Eliminativism (26), The Connectionist/Classical Debate (55), Subsymbolic Computation (46), Deep Learning (26), Philosophy of Connectionism, Misc (106) Philosophy of Connectionism, Foundational Empirical Issues (37), **Machine Learning** (203 | 170), Reinforcement Learning (2), Supervised Learning (8) Unsupervised Learning (8), Deep Learning* (26), Evolutionary Computation (0), Machine Learning, Misc (15), Large Language Models* (46), **Areas of Artificial Intelligence** (1,727 | 296), Artificial Life* (281), Computer Vision (15), Cybernetics (213), Dynamical Systems (228), The Frame Problem (95), Natural Language Processing (97), Large Language Models (46), Areas of Artificial Intelligence, Misc (80), Robotics (627), Generative Artificial Intelligence (30), **Computationalism** (534 | 534), Computationalism in Cognitive Science* (661), Computation and Physical Systems* (703 | 47), **Ethics of Artificial Intelligence** (3,028 | 48), Algorithmic Fairness (196), Artificial Intelligence Safety* (283), Autonomous Vehicles (28), Autonomous Weapons (51), Interpretability in Artificial Intelligence (35), Machine Ethics (551), Moral Status of Artificial Systems (643), Robot Ethics* (504), Explainability in Artificial Intelligence (43), Authorship and Artificial Intelligence (19), Artificial Intelligence and the Law (40), Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, Misc (1,374), **Impact of Artificial Intelligence** (1,144 | 139), Artificial Intelligence Safety (283), Artificial Intelligence and the Law* (40), Autonomous Weapons* (51), Autonomous Vehicles* (28), Cyborgs (28), Mind Uploading (54), The Singularity (112), Transhumanism (445), Impact of Artificial Intelligence, Misc (83) **Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Miscellaneous** (1,123 | 450), Artificial Intelligence Methodology (156), The Nature of Artificial Intelligence (174), Philosophy of AI, General Works (146), Philosophy of AI, Misc (197) - the number of publications is given in brackets.

Appendix 2: Chat GPT's answer to the question about Ps-Hraban's Allegoriae in Sacram Scripturam. Since the question was asked in Polish, I received answers in that language. They can be received in any other examples provided by ChatGPT with his commentary (sic!): "Allegoriae in Sacram Scripturam" is a work attributed to Pseudo-Garnier of Langres, which is a medieval glossary of biblical symbols. It contains allegorical interpretations of various biblical terms and characters. Here are some examples of symbolic representations from this work:

Anioł (Angelus):

Chrystus lub Duch Święty: W interpretacji fragmentu Ewangelii Jana o aniele zstępującym do sadzawki (J 5,4), anioł symbolizuje Chrystusa przychodzącego do ludu żydowskiego lub Ducha Świętego zstępującego do chrzcielnicy, co prowadzi do uzdrowienia wiernych.

Jan Chrzcielca: W prorocztwie Malachiasza (Ml 3,1) anioł oznacza Jana Chrzcielca, który przygotowuje drogę przed Chrystusem.

Duch zły: W Psalmach (Ps 35,5-6) anioł może odnosić się do

złego ducha, który prześladuje grzeszników.

Kapłan: W Księdze Malachiasza (Ml 2,7) anioł jest utożsamiany z kapłanem, który głosi słowo Boże.

Dusza (Anima):

Różne aspekty: Dusza ludzka, ze względu na swoje różnorodne funkcje, otrzymuje różne nazwy:

Gdy ożywia ciało, nazywana jest "anima".

Gdy odczuwa, jest "sensus".

Gdy pamięta, to "memoria".

Gdy rozumie, to "mens".

Gdy rozważa, to "spiritus".

Cały człowiek: Czasami termin "anima" odnosi się do całego człowieka, jak w Księdze Rodzaju (Rdz 46,27), gdzie mówi się o 70 duszach zstępujących do Egiptu, co oznacza 70 osób.

Woda (Aqua):

Wiara: W niektórych kontekstach woda symbolizuje wiarę wypływającą z serca.

Zagrożenie: W innych miejscach woda oznacza niebezpieczeństwo dla życia ludzkiego.

Lew (Leo):

Mesjasz: Lew z pokolenia Judy jest symbolem Mesjasza.

Szatan: W 1 Liście Piotra (1 P 5,8) lew ryczący symbolizuje Szatana szukającego kogo pożreć.

These examples show how "Allegoriae in Sacram Scripturam" interprets various biblical elements in an allegorical way, giving them deeper, spiritual meanings.

Appendix 3: I asked GPT Chat to translate (!) the first verse of the Bible into several languages:

I quote the answer in its entirety.

I give an example of a fragment of Genesis 1:1 ("In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth") in five languages:

1. Aramejski (Targum Onkelos)

אֶרֶצַּת תִּין אֵימָשׁ תִּין אֶרֶב תִּימְדָק
(Baqadmin bara YY yat šamayyā wə-yat ar'ā)
("Na początku Bóg stworzył niebiosa i ziemię")

2. Polski (Biblia Tysiąclecia, V wydanie)

"Na początku Bóg stworzył niebo i ziemię."

3. Łaciński (Wulgata)

"In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram."

4. Grecki (Septuaginta – LXX)

"Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν."
(En archē epoiēsen ho Theos ton ouranon kai tēn gēn.)

5. Angielski (King James Version – KJV)

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

It is one of the most fundamental passages of the Bible, and its translations are the basis for many versions of the Bible text in different linguistic and religious traditions. If you need another verse, let me know! ☺

References

- Bringsjord Govindarajulu, Bringsjord Selmer (2018). <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artificial-intelligence/>.
- Lalande A (1972) Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, PUF: Paris <https://archive.org/details/andre-lalande-vocabulaire-technique-et-critique-de-la-philosophie-vol.-1-a-m-4e-edition>.

3. Rahner K, Vorgrimler H (1987) *A Small Theological Dictionary*, IW PAX: Warszawa: 1-5.
4. Hunt EB (1975) *Artificial Intelligence Iskustvennyj intellekt*, tł. DA Belov, J.I. Krjukov, Moskva: MIR
5. Larson EJ (2021) *The Myth of Artificial Intelligence, Why Computers Can't Think the Way We do*, Belknap Press (Harvard Univ. Press) https://www.hup.harvard.edu/file/feeds/PDF/9780674278660_sample.pdf.
6. Gaudet MJ (2022) An Introduction to the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. *JMT* 11: 1-12.
7. Świerczyński W, Marek Z (2023) A Uniform Artificial Intelligence Statute, *Zeszyty Prawnicze* 23: 217-253.
8. (2023) Sztuczna inteligencja <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pl/headlines/society/20200827STO85804/sztuczna-inteligencja-co-to-jest-i-jakie-ma-zastosowania>.
9. Isaacs A (2024) The Dangers of Artificial Intelligence to Theology: A Comprehensive Analysis. <https://christoverall.com/article/concise/the-dangers-of-artificial-intelligence-to-theology-a-comprehensive-analysis/>.
10. Dietrich T (2025) <https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-artificial-intelligence>.
11. Müller VC (2024) Philosophy of AI: A Structured Overview. In: Nathalie Smuha, ed., *Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence*, Cambridge Univ. Press: Cambridge: 1-25.
12. Joseph IMB (2024) *Lectures on General Methodology* (Rome, 1934-1935) Wolski Publishing House: 1-216.
13. Kant, Immanuel(2009) Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Leipzig: L. Voss. <https://archive.org/details/immanuelkantkri00kantuoft>.
14. Edith Stein (1991) *Introduction to Philosophy*, Herder Vlg Wien: 1-280.
15. Edith Stein (2016) *Philosophy of psychology and the humanities*, Discalced Carmelites Publishing House. <https://epub.pl/filozofia-psychologii-i-humanistyki/>.
16. Hyeongjoo K (2022) Kant And Artificial Intelligence, *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/57223/9783110706611.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
17. Gouveia SS (2024) Carlos. Phenomenology and artificial intelligence: introductory notes, „Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science: Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence: Bridges and New Paths” 1009-1015.
18. Grygiel WP (2005) Artificial intelligence and scholastic epistemology, *Annales UMCS Informatica*: 93-103.
19. Oviedo L (2022) Artificial Intelligence and Theology: Looking for a positive- but not uncritical - reception, “*Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science*” 57: 938-952.
20. Windelband W (1900) *History of Philosophy*, Tübingen, JCB Mohr, P. Siebeck <https://archive.org/details/geschichtederphi00windorff>.
21. Wilamowitz Moellendorf Ulrich von (1905) *Die Griechische Literatur des Altertums*. In: *Die Griechische und Lateinische Literatur und Sprache*, G. Teubner: Berlin-Leipzig: 1-236.
22. Götttert KH (1991)) Introduction to Rhetoric, Publication in the German National Bibliography. https://beckassets.blob.core.windows.net/product/readingsample/9045767/9783825215996_excerpt_001.pdf.
23. Volkmann R (1885) The rhetoric of the Greeks and Romans, presented in a systematic overview: 1-621.
24. Jakub ZL (2024) Retoryka: Historia Literatary Rhetoric: History Of Literature. <https://polon.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/221/2025/01/FAR-2024-1-3-05.12.2024.pdf>.
25. Lichański JZ (2021) Retoryka, dowód ontologiczny Kurta Gödla, teologia. Kilka uwag, “*Forum Artis Rhetoricae* 64: 49-59.
26. Charles Bazerman, Anis Bawarshi, Mary Jo Reiff (2005) Charles Bazerman, Joseph Little, Lisa Bethel, Teri Chavkin, Danielle Fouquette, and Janet Garufis, Parlor Press LLC: 1-188.
27. Ranade N, Saravia M (2024) Using rhetorical strategies to design prompts: a human-in-the-loop approach to make AI useful. “*AI & Society*”: 1-22.
28. Hallsby, Atilla (2024) A Copious Void: Rhetoric as Artificial Intelligence 1.0, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 54: 232-246
29. Abelard, Piotr (1969) *Roch Filozoficzny*. Transaction Publishers: 1-814.
30. Clay G, Ontiveros C (2023) Philosophers ought to develop, theorize about, and use philosophically relevant AI. *Meta philosophy* 54: 463-479.
31. Barone FP, Mace CU, Pablo (2017) *Philologie, Herméneutique et histoire des Textes entre Orient et Occident*. Melanges en hommage à Sever J. Voicu, Brepols Pbl Turnhouse : 311-313.
32. Lichański JZ (2000) Meaning Are the tools of rhetoric useful in studying the matter, *Lodz University Press* 58: 3.
33. Berger Klaus (1987) Einführung in die Formgeschichte, Francke Vlg.: Tübingen 1987 [UTB 1444].
34. (2022) *Journal of Moral Theology*” 11: 1. <https://jmt.scholasticahq.com/issue/4236-vol-11-issue-si1-2022>.
35. Krzysztof Bieroń, (1961) *Secrets of artificial animals*, Public Library in Tuchów 1-134.
36. Dorobantu, Marius (2024) *Artificial Intelligence and Christianity Friends or Foes*, Cambridge University Press 6: 88-108.
37. (2025) Vesuvius Challenge, <https://scrollprize.org/>.
38. (2025) *Herculaneum papyri* : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herculaneum_papyri.
39. (2025) How A.I. Is Helping Scholars, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/ai-finds-new-clues-dead-sea-scrolls-origins-180977571/>.
40. (2025) Inside the AI competition, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/inside-the-ai-competition-that-decoded-an-ancient-scroll-and-changed/>.
41. (2017) *Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing*, ed. by Duane Roen, Nicholas N. Behm, Sherry Rankins-Robertson, Parlor Press LLC: Anderson, South Carolina https://parlorpress.com/en-in/products/framework-for-success-in-postsecondary-writing?srltid=AfmBOoqYtOtujkUWg3Y1H3eLsXxa8mWcV3rvUAdWhelDS9OYJvImAq_.
42. Grzegorz N (2023) *Contemporary Humanities*, ed. Bogusława Bodzioch-Bryła, Scientific Publishing House of the Ignatianum: 1-390.
43. (1994) *Interpretacja Pisma Świętego w Kościele*, tł. Bp. K. Romaniuk, Wyd. Pallotinum: Poznań
44. Beth Singler, Fraser Watts (2024) *The Cambridge Companion To Religion And Artificial Intelligence*. University of Cambridge https://assets.cambridge.org/9781316516034/frontmatter/9781316516034_frontmatter.pdf.
45. Analiza T (1983) Metafizyka jako nauka o bycie jako takim, <https://www.akademikatolicka.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Arystoteles-Metafizyka-Filozofia-pierwsza.pdf>.
46. Benz Müller C, Woltzenlogel P (2014) Automating Gödel's Ontological Proof of God's Existence " with Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers. IOS Press: 93-98.
47. Hoppmann M, Statuslehre (2007) *Historical Dictionary of Rhetoric*, Bd. 8: 1327-1358.
48. *JMT Journal of Moral Theology*” <https://www.jstor.org/stable/29782260>.
49. Lichański Jakub Z (2023) Stanisław Lem and Artificial

- Intelligence, Literary Memoir (Londyn)” 2 t. LXVI: 49-65.
50. Migne Jacques, *Patrologia Latina* (2025). https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/1815-1875,_Migne,_Patrologia_Latina_01._Rerum_Conspectus_Pro_Tomis_Ordinatus,_MLT-1.html.
51. Migne J, *Patrologia G* (2025). https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/25_2025-_Rerum_Conspectus_Pro_Auctoribus_Ordinatus.html.
52. Steven Gouveia (2024) *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence: Bridges and New Paths*, Springer Nature: 23.
53. Windelband, (2023) *Wilhelm Windelband's Historical Philosophy: The Path from Neo-Kantianism to Neo-Hegelianism*, British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication: 1-251.
54. Wiener (1961) Wiener, Norbert. *Cybernetyka a społeczeństwo*, tł., posłowie, O. Wojtasiewicz, KiW: Warszawa.
55. Otto Neurath (1973) *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis*, Springer 299-338.

Copyright: ©2026 Jakub Z Lichański. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.