

Five Decads Stunck in Underdevelopment: Why Angola Continue Poor?

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ABSTRACT

After five decades, Angola has proven incapable of breaking out of its cycle of underdevelopment. In this approach, I seek to highlight some evidence that contributes to the failure of the Angolan economy to prosper. Much of this evidence points to the strong contribution of political, administrative, and fiscal centralization to high levels of multidimensional poverty. The past five decades have promoted vicious circles that have contributed to the ability to generate wealth on a private basis. On the other hand, the significantly exclusive institutions that exist have led the economy to stagnation with a strong dependence on international markets, whose economy, lacking the capacity for transformation, has become an economy of expectations based on these markets in particular. On the other hand, the inability to govern naturally reveals the main driver of stagnation in marked underdevelopment, being strongly associated with the inability to generate wealth for the majority.

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Introduction

To understand the persistent poverty in Angola, it is necessary to understand the reasons that have made the country unprosperous, with an economy significantly dependent on international markets, where poverty is characterized most notably by the economic informality that still dominates all sectors of activity. On the other hand, it is an economy based on natural resources, with particular relevance to energy resources, which naturally channel a large part of the economic dependence. On the other hand, mineral resources such as diamonds have a strong and relevant share in the GDP of the Angolan economy.

Angola gained its independence from Portugal in the 1970s, specifically in 1975. Thus, until the date of independence, Angola had relatively slow economic growth and a less robust economy, strengthened at the time by traditional sectors. From 1970 to 1975, it had a GDP of USD 3 billion, USD 4 billion, USD 4 billion, USD 5 billion, USD 5.6 billion, and USD 4 billion, respectively. The agriculture and mining sectors contributed relatively to GDP growth, but the weak appreciation of oil prices did not allow the Angolan economy to characterize itself as sufficiently resilient at the time. Until independence, Angola had a growth rate of less than three percent, which means that independence was achieved at a time when the economic situation was not so favorable. In the following years, the economy naturally stabilized significantly as a result of the appreciation of certain minerals and the energy sector, such as diamonds and oil, respectively, which naturally gave the economy slight sustainability during the 1980s, despite naturally strong negative growth rates in the economy. The achievement

of independence by the Angolan authorities naturally had some implications for the economy and the independent nation's ability to generate wealth. The difficulty of institutions to assert themselves was nevertheless characterized by continuous political interference by the authorities. However, these were quantified through the civil war that prevailed in Angola for two decades, specifically the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The political sharing of power and the sharing of institutions, on the one hand, significantly motivated the existence of these interferences. Thus, it is naturally important to understand some phases of the Angolan economy, specifically the phase prior to Angola's independence, which was particularly characterized by the existence of an economy without the capacity to assert itself in the international context, largely sustained by a large part of the traditional sectors that at the time constituted and guaranteed economic growth, especially in the 1960s, when the economy was particularly based on agricultural commodities, which at the time were in fact relevant to the economy's production capacity in particular. On the one hand, there was naturally diversification in exports to the main emerging markets, for example, to markets such as Portugal and other relevant markets in Europe, in particular. Naturally, at that time, Angola had a much greater export capacity than it does in reality today. The next phase of the Angolan economy deals specifically with the post-independence period, a phase in which the capacity of institutions failed significantly. This was naturally the phase in which the Angolan economy experienced largely low rates of economic growth, mainly driven by continuous political interference associated with constant conflicts, which, on the one hand, significantly determined the course of the current political and economic institutions that exist in the country and, on the other hand, in this second phase of the Angolan economy, there was a major peculiarity related to the existence of an economy

with strong contributions from the mining industry, for example diamonds and the energy sector, which was nevertheless the biggest driver of the economy, particularly during the period characterized by political interference due to the civil war. The affirmation of international markets, especially the diamond market, with the increase in prices on international markets, was in fact relevant and significant for sustainability. However, during this phase, especially in the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s, the economy experienced some instability, strongly driven by political interference. In 1992, there were particularly negative economic growth rates.

The third phase of the Angolan economy corresponds precisely to the post-peace period, which was naturally characterized during the 2000s, specifically in the decade of 2002. From this year onwards, Angola did in fact experience some relative affirmation in its economy, with greater relevance in sustained growth in the energy sector from 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014. However, these were periods of strong affirmation of the Angolan economy, especially considering the great capacity that the economy naturally had to translate economic sustainability through, for example, the energy sector, which largely helped to boost the economy. Naturally, this was the golden age of the Angolan economy, with characteristics that allowed the economy to suggest greater production capacity. However, on the other hand, this phase was underutilized by the authorities, who were in fact unable to ensure that during this period the economy could, for example, achieve greater economic stability and, on the other hand, demonstrate marked economic resilience.

Thus, the failure of public policies on the part of the authorities strengthened the inefficiencies of institutions, which were strongly characterized by, for example, very significant levels of corruption, which largely prevented any marked improvement in the respective institutions. Government inefficiency, which was associated with the inability of governments to govern, contributed greatly to the formation of the vicious circles that Angola currently faces. These circles remain to this day, where continued inefficiency strongly prevails, characterized, for example, by a political structure that does not align with the sustainable development goals particularly desired by the authorities. The continuation of these vicious circles may in fact introduce another factor that has always been in line with the current levels of multidimensional poverty seen in all regions of the country. Thus, in particular, the aim is to understand why Angola remains poor and its economic institutions significantly fragile and unstable, and to understand the reasons that nevertheless keep the country in a continuous state of imprisonment and dependence on international markets.

Causal Poverty in Angola

The work of Acemoglu and Robinson, in *Why Nations Fail*, shows precisely how nations fail because of the institutions that their authorities implement as the basis for marked underdevelopment, strongly supported by institutional ignorance [1]. For decades in Angola, the way in which independence was achieved has significantly determined the affirmation of both current politics and the economy. However, 50 years of independence, on the other hand, show precisely that there is a continuing political incapacity on the part of the authorities, who have nevertheless formed a state with a significantly vicious circle linked to continuous underdevelopment. Causal poverty in Angola is driven by the plausible and continuous increase in institutional failure. The vicious circle has intensified significantly and, on the other hand, without the effective capacity of these circles to, for example, change the course and desirable trajectory of the country, The

economy continues to show no substantial improvements that could be quantified in terms of a plausible capacity to generate wealth and, on the other hand, the capacity to better distribute wealth to the majority of poor regions in Angola. The continued centralization of power in Angola naturally guarantees less effective distribution of wealth, but some reasons may in fact be related to the high levels of concentration of the Angolan economy in just one city, namely Luanda, which is the capital and concentrates a large part of the relevant activities that promote the development and sustainable growth of the regions.

The Angolan economy's capacity to generate wealth is not in line with the medium- and long- term objectives necessary to effectively drive a degree of sustainable development. Some reasons for this are particularly related to, for example, the inability of different public policies to enable them to be sufficiently capable of generating wealth and sustainability for the country. In the post-war period, Angola did indeed experience its best period of affirmation, both nationally and internationally, with better alternatives for consolidating greater economic and social prosperity that was sufficiently sustainable. On the other hand, however, the long- term objectives were unattainable, given the inability of these policies to bring about the desired change sought by the authorities.

Thus, the priorities after independence were not achieved as they should have been. This is naturally due to the fact that the political authorities, precisely during the period that should have served for economic and industrial consolidation, suffered continuous failure. On the one hand, they were naturally replaced by vicious circles, which largely predominate and tend to show a tendency toward continuity between the policies that have been implemented in most situations. Governance and institutions naturally constitute the pillars of Angola's continued underdevelopment and the main reason why Angola remains poor today and without any real prosperity. The economy lacks the power to drive the necessary capabilities to ensure that economic and sustainable development is effective and has a degree of resilience and prosperity aligned with long-term goals that enable countries to achieve economic resilience associated mainly with the plausible promotion of economic institutions and the economic structure itself, as the evidence suggests, in accordance with the current economic and political reality.

Governance and the vicious circle in Angola have in fact brought about some causal inconsistency, related to a continued inability of institutions to generate wealth. The evidence shows precisely that the authorities, for the most part, have in fact contributed to and, on the other hand, plausibly increased the capacity for economic destruction, which has been carried out through mechanisms that have not helped, for example, to boost economic growth and, in particular, the growth of the various production capacities significantly established by the Angolan authorities. The authorities were unable to ensure that the Angolan economy could in fact achieve any degree of sustainability associated with mechanisms that could nevertheless have a significant effect on the growth of the economy and the respective regions, underdevelopment is effectively greater and aligned above all with the degree of underdevelopment.

The destruction of the Angolan economy was effectively brought about by the authorities' weak capacity for change. Most of these authorities were unable to achieve any significant degree of growth that could actually translate into resilience. However, the country remained poor and with no margin for change. Thus, the economy

followed a particularly distinct path, with no possibility of actually conveying any degree of confidence. The failure to transform the Angolan economy reflects a continued dependence on international markets, which have decision-making power over the structure and stability of the Angolan economy in particular. On the other hand, there is in fact no alignment with the naturally intended objectives.

Governance in Angola continues to be the pillar of continued underdevelopment and the fundamental reason why the country is stuck in a vicious circle, in line with the lack of democratic plurality and political inclusion as factors that could leverage inclusive political prosperity and greater participation by its main players. Angola has become a haven for failed public policies, and this failure is in fact aligned with strong vicious circles. Thus, the 50 years of governance by the current party clearly show a disaster at all levels of governance, with a strongly exclusive policy supported by institutions that are significantly incapable of translating any degree of growth or, in particular, any associated sustainability. On the other hand, the predominance of vicious circles has in fact developed a chain of countries with policies that accentuate continuous multidimensional poverty, which is in fact the greatest driver of underdevelopment and effective imprisonment, where the country in particular finds itself chained without any prospects for change towards a plausible transformation.

Naturally, governance actually runs counter to current political institutions and the government's current ability to, for example, introduce major plausible changes that are in line with the objectives of economic and political sustainability, particularly in Angola. Thus, much of the economic failure is nevertheless directed at governance as the major political actor that should, in particular, contribute effectively to greater prosperity. The last 50 years in particular show precisely how institutions have been unable to transform the country. Angola's causal poverty stems from the lack of a set of institutions that are both firm in their ability to substantially reduce poverty and better able to ensure a change in the current policy framework. On the other hand, causal poverty is based on the inability of public policies to transform themselves into a set of factors with transformative characteristics and the capacity to actually introduce plausible change in the scenario of plausible development and marked sustainable growth in particular.

Angola's capacity for transformation, however, effectively positions Angola as a country without any real capacity to prosper in the medium and long term, in line with infrastructure levels. Most developed countries tend to have a set of infrastructures that are sufficiently capable of translating a key factor of economic transformation in these institutions. Infrastructure as a key factor in economic transformation is naturally aligned with a more important factor that is in fact associated with both the need for development and the causal capacity of the country in question to suggest a change of trajectory in terms of the implementation of certain public policies capable of promoting significant change.

Angolan politics, as in many other poor countries with totalitarian regimes, has naturally ceased to be a plausible instrument of economic prosperity and has become an instrument for sustaining vicious circles and accelerating the capacity to generate wealth through private means, as the evidence suggests. Thus, this evidence contributes to a better understanding of how the ability to generate private wealth in line with medium- and long-term objectives tends to sustain a large part of the sustainability of politicians' actions in the form of private wealth and without any discernible capacity.

However, a large part of public finances have in fact been unsustainable, above all unable to affirm, for example, whether in most public institutions, thus, while there is still a large degree of fiscal centralization and, on the other hand, associated with the great particularity of these institutions being inefficient, naturally, on the other hand, there will be and will continue to be, with some regularity, failures, both institutional and political, in particular.

On the other hand, five decades of imprisonment in underdevelopment provide, for example, the great existential failure on the part of these institutions to be able to effectively guarantee that, on the one hand, the engines of prosperity exist. However, these engines are still absent, and thus, the five decades actually suggest the failure to implement institutions with a view to ensuring growth, for example. Higher education, for example, is naturally the greatest of the economy and the sustainability of societies in particular. Angola therefore has a very deficient network of higher education institutions that are completely uncompetitive. Most higher education institutions in Angola are in fact inefficient, mainly due to the fact that they are largely aligned with the continuous failure and inability of most institutions to build a solid foundation that makes the country sustainable and, on the other hand, serves as a basis for promoting economic prosperity more rapidly.

High levels of institutional corruption are a major factor in the failure of the Angolan economy. On the other hand, the political trajectory has contributed strongly to the failure of both the economy and greater economic and political progress, particularly in line with the weak participation of the authorities in their natural ability to provide, for example, lasting sustainability consistent with medium and long-term objectives, particularly when it comes to these institutions naturally being able to translate some degree of growth and resilience into the economy. On the other hand, it is nevertheless plausible to understand how Angola's five decades have in fact been decisive in increasing causal and, above all, unsustainable impoverishment from the point of view of growth capacity, which should naturally translate into a different economic path. However, economic stagnation, driven by both economic and political institutions, has not been able to suggest, for example, any degree of sustainability for significant improvement and a different path.

However, governance has failed as a pillar for promoting freedom. In most regions of Angola, the population is deprived of its fundamental freedoms, such as democratic freedom and economic freedom, which are denied to the majority. The deprivation of freedoms by the Angolan authorities has turned the country into a society with unattainable dreams, where the potential of a large part of the human capital is not being fully exploited. On the other hand, there is a strong deprivation of freedoms in terms of better basic education and quality higher education. This particularly translates into a poor country without prosperity for the majority of the young population of an age where they could naturally be able to achieve a high level of education, which is desired so that there can be some improvement, especially in relation to their ability to contribute to mechanisms that can actually generate wealth. Thus, the approaches of allow us to understand how a large part of nations become continuously poor by not being able to channel the necessary freedoms to their inhabitants. the absence of these freedoms in Angola makes it a state in the process of becoming a failed society, particularly due to the failure to implement inclusive policies that should guarantee greater freedom for its citizens [2]. Thus, the political and fiscal concentration on the part of the authorities promotes a significantly inefficient budgetary policy

that is incapable of translating into any plausible results in the short, medium, and long term, as the evidence in most regions of Angola suggests. On the other hand, there is no social protection in Angola that is capable of translating into social balance and, on the other hand, ensuring that populations are naturally able to enjoy their freedoms. Thus, consistently, most Angolans find themselves in the poverty trap, where they do not have the capacity to naturally obtain future income. This is strongly in line with the approach analyzed in, whereby when a large part of the population is deprived of the minimum and basic conditions to ensure future sustainability, its population naturally ends up trapped in poverty [3]. This approach is particularly aligned with the basic needs approach, thus, naturally, when these are not particularly satisfied, which makes these countries failed states, this approach is strongly reinforced in, with some relevance, the approach nevertheless contributes to a better understanding of how governance failures in Angola tend to channel the country into a failed and failed state, as suggested by most African countries, for example, countries such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, and Niger, see to understand with more detail this approach [4-7]. show significant contributions with more efficient.

The poverty trap and the approach to basic needs are driven, on the one hand, by the inability to distribute wealth effectively and, on the other hand, by the inability to generate wealth and ensure profound transformations, both economically and institutionally. particularly at the institutional level, there is still an associated failure, especially in the capacity of these institutions to actually promote better sustainability as the best plausible alternative for inclusion, especially in public policies, capable of translating some plausible importance. Thus, with the needs-based approach, it is still plausible to understand the responsiveness of public policies, as analyzed in on the other hand, this approach is significantly driven with particular relevance to introduce greater inclusion and political participation in the different decisions that most institutions should in fact implement. reinforces this approach with an emphasis on the ability to include greater institutional dynamics [8-12].

A large part of multidimensional poverty in Angola is mainly based on the exclusion of rural areas from public policies. This exclusion is strongly driven by the lack of inclusion and, on the other hand, by the lack of decentralization capacity on the part of the regions. Thus, policies have mainly superficial effects in terms of applicability. However, inland regions tend to experience greater social exclusion and multidimensional poverty, in line with, for example, the exclusion of policies aimed at family farming, which is not sufficiently capable of suggesting any plausible improvement in terms of the need for regional transformation. Thus, some evidence shows precisely that family farming has a causal effect on poverty, particularly when it is not in line with production and productivity levels in particular [13]. Governance as a political process combines the relevant factors that translate into sustainable development. Naturally, good governance is in fact a set of factors that combine various administrative management capacities. However, good governance also means efficient use of resources, and when these resources are well managed, they naturally ensure more effective use of resources.

The Unattainable Economic Transformation in Angola

Angola, in particular, did indeed experience periods of great importance that would have allowed it to guarantee causal sustainability as a factor for economic growth. However, during this period, governance capacity was not sufficiently capable

of driving significant changes in the economic structure. Naturally, for precisely eight years, the economy experienced its best performance. This performance was largely sustained by contributions from the energy industry, which was the main driver of growth. On the other hand, the inability to govern effectively meant that the economy was unable to ensure resilience and introduce profound changes, as a result of the decline of its institutions and the continued failure of governance. In particular, governance did not plausibly convey any confidence to its stakeholders, nor did it contribute to the affirmation of the Angolan economy in the global context. Naturally, the result of the lack of economic transformation is evidenced by a combination of factors, such as the lack of infrastructure, the lack of political and economic institutions capable of translating the desired levels of economic transformation, and the inconsistency of public policies with economic institutions. On the other hand, there is a degree of non-materialization of a set of public policies that are nevertheless effective and efficient, such as those that can in fact guarantee the political consistency of institutions and economic consistency in line with desirable medium- and long-term objectives.

Governance in Angola, as the evidence suggests, has particularly transformed the country a society lacking opportunities, naturally opportunities for a majority that should nevertheless contribute plausibly to greater institutional sustainability in particular. Growth is not sustainable and, above all, proves incapable of affirming economic institutions and politics in particular. As most approaches suggest, during the golden age of the Angolan economy, economic growth was nevertheless characterized by the fact that it was not enriching from the outset, particularly because it was considered to be growth whose sustainability was not evident from the outset, especially considering the fact that the economy was relatively dependent on international markets. Thus, the Angolan economy's heavy dependence on international markets was nevertheless the main reason that naturally led to the sharp decline of the economy in particular, especially considering that during this period the economy did not provide sufficient grounds for strengthening the economy in particular and, above all, with the aim of making it as resilient as possible.

Angola is currently experiencing causal poverty, due in part to institutions not following a path that would lead the country to marked economic prosperity. Thus, there are particular differences regarding objectives and the growth itself that is necessary. The Angolan economy is not yet capable of translating these effects, due to the initial lack of major drivers of the economy. However, economic uncertainty is mainly on a large scale, considering, for example, the fact that these economies result from a different pattern of production capacity and the capacity itself to sustain the growth of these respective institutions. Thus, it is plausible that markets naturally determine the course of the Angolan economy, especially considering the fact that institutions are not, for example, sufficiently capable of suggesting any long-term prosperity.

Naturally, one of the reasons for the failure of the Angolan economy to prosper has precisely to do with the fact that adjustments are not aligned with long-term goals. In most economic institutions, there are in fact a number of reasons that contribute to the failure of the economy in general. The inability to achieve economic transformation is, on the one hand, linked to failures in governance associated with structural imbalances, for example due to the structural imbalances in the economy. On the other hand, some factors tend to contribute to this failure through these institutions and through the inability of the authorities to effectively establish synchrony between policy and institutions. Governance as a

plausible instrument for boosting the economy has, on the other hand, failed systematically, so that the failure of the economy was nevertheless persistent with objectives that naturally reflected some plausible inconsistency.

Thus, Angola today fails particularly because five decades of economic prosperity have turned into five decades of vicious circles, which naturally transformed a large part of the economic institutions into powerful entities capable of generating private wealth. On the other hand, the authorities' exploitation of this situation turned the vicious circles into a continuous set of institutions incapable of driving greater growth through economic transformation. Economic institutions have promoted economic failure in association with both vicious circles and the lack of plausible capacity for sustained growth. On the other hand, the lack of decentralization is a plausible reason for the economy's heavy dependence on international markets, where international markets predominate, especially in relation to natural resources. Plausibly, the Angolan authorities still have the capacity for significant economic transformation, especially with a significantly pronounced destructuring of the economy. The lack of plausible agrarian reform effectively makes the country's economy hostage to multidimensional poverty at the regional level, particularly in regions where family farming is still the main driver of prosperity and, on the other hand, the main driver of growth through its respective institutions and, on the other hand, through the great capacity that these should in fact provide. On the one hand, industrialization does not exist on a large scale due to certain particularities, such as the fact that educational institutions are in fact in continuous decline and without any real capacity to prosper efficiently and plausibly.

Conclusion

Angola's economic potential does indeed make it a country with the characteristics of a great sleeping giant in Southern Africa. However, much of this potential does not contribute to establishing that there is naturally any possible prosperity. There is no plausible convergence between economic institutions and the needs for economic transformation. The economy has not in fact brought any plausibility to the need for these to generate wealth and, on the other hand, generate growth. Economic growth has largely been characterized by the fact that it is not naturally enriching. During its economic golden age, Angola did not have the capacity to guarantee enriching growth that could suggest higher levels of production capacity. By way of comparison, the capacity to generate wealth is still below the margins of development and sustainability. The concentration of power and the model of governance adopted by the authorities is not plausible for introducing efficient institutional performance from the point of view of governance and the structure of governance itself. On the other hand, there is in fact a great divergence between institutions and governance. In particular, governance does not translate into the plausible effects of the objectives that it naturally aims for in order to plausibly boost the capacity for political integration.

Angola, on the one hand, fails because the form of the state, although unitary, is not capable of guaranteeing a profound economic transformation, as well as a democratic and political one. Democracy is stagnant and lacks plurality, naturally because the political and judicial institutions do not allow it, and politics is compromised due to the levels that these institutions tend to present with regard to the mechanisms that could actually boost political inclusion. Thus, it is non-existent because political and democratic concentration tends to exclude most political actors from political activity and democracy in general. The current

failure of democracy reflects, with some plausible relevance, political inconsistency and leads to a series of failures related to the economy in particular. The five decades of a single party ruling Angola reflect how democracy itself promotes Angola's imprisonment in underdevelopment and the lack of representation of real politics.

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