Earmarks: Motivation for the U. S. Congress’ Continued Use of Omnibus Appropriations Bills in the Budget Process
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47363/JPSIR/2026(4)162Keywords:
Earmarks, Omnibus Appropriations Bills, Pork-Barrel Legislation, Government Shutdown, Elections, CampaignsAbstract
Several articles have been written about Congress’ continued use of omnibus appropriations bills in its yearly programmatic budget allocations or funding. This congressional behavior started in the 1982 Fiscal Year after its initial, but experimental, introduction to the budget process in 1950. In some of the literature, writers appear to have laid much emphases on what they perceive as negative repercussions emanating from the excessive use of omnibus appropriations bills but without sufficiently delving into the conditions that have motivated this congressional behavior. Given this gap, therefore, an attempt is made, in this study, to establish a direct correlation between Congress’ contemporary use of omnibus appropriations bills relative to the underlying political and structural considerations that facilitate or drive this behavior. The specific rationale underlying this effort is to demonstrate that, for as long as Congress-members continue to be confronted by these political and structural factors, over which they may have very little or no control, the use of omnibus appropriations bills in the budget process, along with their corresponding multiplicity of earmarks will continue into the unforeseeable future.