The Instinct of Inferences and False Executions The Process of Understanding beyond Meanings

Abstract

This work aims to demonstrate that linguistic acts often constitute false executions, diverging from the established rules of a linguistic game or the maxims of cooperation. Enunciation, in this sense, relies heavily on assumptions of ambiguity and vagueness, functioning primarily through an indeterminate inferential mechanism. Were this not the case, we would be compelled to exclude from discourse a significant number of linguistic forms that deviate from established classifications. Drawing on Austin’s concept of illocutionary force and conditions of happiness, as presented in his Harvard lectures, and integrating Grice’s analysis of logic and conversation, particularly his focus on implicature, this study highlights how certain assertive-representative expressions—despite their
scientific inaccuracy—can still induce behavioral changes in recipients. By examining the performative nature of language and the dynamics of inference, we aim to shed light on how speakers navigate these linguistic ambiguities, offering a more comprehensive understanding of communication’s practical functions in real-world contexts. In doing so, we challenge traditional boundaries of linguistic theory, suggesting that the role of inference and expectation is more central to communication than previously acknowledged.